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Le qyxrespaw decst nd?
Authoritarian Leaders, the Internet, and
International Politics
by David P. Fidler
OMG! ASSAD ON INSTAGRAM?
In late summer 2013, commentary started to crackle over Syrian President Bashir
al-Assad's use of Instagram, a social media tool owned by Facebook, to post pictures
of himself and his family.1 The use of Instagram by a dictator-one waging a civil
war and accused of using chemical weapons against civilians-prompted criticism of
this old-fashioned propaganda digitized for the cyber age.2 But, Assad is not alone
among authoritarian leaders embracing Instagram:
Assad is the latest in what one news site has called 'the dictators of Instagram. ' Chechen
President Ramzan Kadrov has famously used the social-networking site as a pla~orm to
project his vey Russian syle of masculinis y (photo montages of the inpossiby barrel-
chested despot weight- ifing and posing wi/h wolves and wildcats.) The minions of
Ajatollah Khamenei haveposted several close-ups of Iran s septuagenarian Supreme Leader
on his photo-sharing page.3
Other authoritarian leaders have shown interest in social media. Vladimir Putin
of Russia, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan, and the North Korean government all have
Twitter accounts. Before his death in March 2013, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela avidly
tweeted to over 4 million followers. 4 Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has a Facebook
page. Use of social media and the internet by authoritarian leaders can seem like old
(and tasteless) wine in new bottles-propaganda delivered through the latest
technologies. Authoritarian leaders have long exploited new communication
technologies, and their interest in cyber propaganda is more of the same. However,
the growing presence of authoritarian leaders in cyberspace might constitute more
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than propaganda. This trend, when viewed with other developments, reflects deeper
change in perceptions about the internet in world affairs-a shift from seeing the
internet's role in international relations through a domestic lens to viewing
cyberspace embedded in anarchical politics among states.
To date, a frequent if not dominant framing of the internet's place in
international relations emphasizes domestic issues by looking at how non-state
actors use cyberspace to affect domestic regimes, especially within authoritarian
governments. Debates over social media's role in the Arab Spring revolutions
illustrate this domestic-level focus, as do "internet freedom" initiatives targeting
authoritarian governments' behavior in cyberspace. This framing casts the internet as
empowering individuals and non-state actors in cyberspace, supporting democratic
governance, and threatening authoritarian regimes.
However, this domestic perspective has difficulty explaining authoritarian
leaders who increasingly exploit cyberspace for their own purposes. Some
commentators noted the oddity of Assad uploading pictures on Instagram where
viewers could post responses-certainly a different kind of propaganda than
practiced by past authoritarian leaders. 5 Chavez initially branded Twitter an
instrument of his enemies-a position consistent with cyberspace being a threat to
authoritarian regimes-before he became a prolific tweeter .6
An alternative explanation sees Assad's Instagram account and Chavez's tweets
intertwined with other developments that challenge framing the internet as a
domestic-regime issue in international relations, including efforts by authoritarian
governments to increase control over internet activities, shifts in U.S. cybersecurity
policy, and Edward Snowden's disclosures about U.S. cyber activities. Together, these
developments highlight how realpo/itik might increasingly characterize cyberspace as
part of international relations.
The shift from a domestic-regime focus to an international-system perspective
suits authoritarian leaders because it casts cyberspace as less of a threat to their
survival and more of an instrument of their power. The shift hurts efforts to
connect the internet with democratic governance within states. Draining such
democracy preferences helps authoritarian leaders justify their internet activities,
especially their emphasis on internal and external security threats. The more the
internet operates, and appears to operate, as just another technology subject to
power politics, the more authoritarian leaders find cyberspace conducive to their
machinations at home and abroad.
CYBERSPACE THROUGH "IMAGES" OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In examining the causes of conflict. Kenneth Waltz explored whether human
behavior (first image), domestic structures of states (second image), or international
anarchy (third image) best explained international conflict.7 These "images" prove
useful in exploring cyberspace in international relations because discourse has,
roughly speaking, moved from "first image" conceptions focused on the individual
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into "second image" ideas emphasizing cyberspace's relationship with domestic
regimes. Eventually, "third image" readings emerged more strongly and, as this essay
argues, gained ascendancy in ways that benefit authoritarian leaders and their
regimes.
Beginning at the End of History
Although the internet's origins are in Cold War projects funded by the U.S.
Department of Defense, cyberspace only became a prominent issue in the post-Cold
War years, especially after the World Wide Web's adoption in the mid-1990s. The
internet and cyberspace did not emerge in an environment characterized by great
power competition and mistrust. Rather, experts often characterize this period as
dominated by U.S. power and ideas-American
hegemony and the triumph of liberalism. The internet THE INTERNET
and cyberspace began in the midst of the "end of
history" moment of world affairs.
This moment encouraged a focus on the BEGAN IN THE
individual's relationship with the new technology's MIDST OF THE
impact on human behavior-a "first image" "END OF HISTORY"
perspective. One iconic example is John Perry Barlow's
A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace from 1996.8 MOMENT OF
The Declaration rejected government intrusion into WORLD AFFAIRS.
cyberspace and claimed individuals around the world
"are forming our own Social Contract" without governments and their divisive,
jurisdictional baggage. 9 It chastised democratic and authoritarian governments alike
for "trying to ward off the virus of liberty by erecting guard posts at the frontiers of
Cyberspace."10 Barlow's vision had no tolerance for distinguishing between domestic
regimes or for a system of states defined by the exercise of material power. Instead,
individuals would determine cyberspace's fate and "create a civilization of the Mind
in Cyberspace. May it be more humane and fair than the world your governments
have made before."1 1
People using the internet when the Declaration appeared might not have
understood what Barlow envisioned, but what the internet facilitated was unlike
anything previously experienced. But, the unique context in which cyberspace
emerged was often unaddressed in these years. Imagination had space to roam,
unencumbered by "democracy v. dictatorship" debates or threats associated with the
harsh logic of structural anarchy.
Second-Image Shift
However, more experience with the internet and cyberspace generated political
thinking that emphasized the government and the state. Lawrence Lessig argued that
"code is law"-software code shapes behavior as codes of formal law do. 12 Thus,
individuals and societies need to use governance mechanisms to ensure that the
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reliance on software, fueled by commercial interests and market forces, reflects
values and interests polities deem important. Lessig focused on domestic politics and
governance, reflecting a "second image" understanding of the significance of the
internet and cyberspace.
Similarly, debates arose about whether states with fixed boundaries could
regulate the internet-a technology that defied borders. 13 An important feature of
these debates is the focus on the state and its jurisdiction in a system of states, which
raises third-image problems. Questions about regulating internet activities also
implicated differences among states on domestic issues, such as freedom of speech.
Such differences created the need to examine not only international rules about
extraterritorial application of domestic law, but also divergence among countries on
individual rights. The internet became important for human rights because internet
access supported many rights, such as freedom of association and education, and
perhaps constituted a right itself.14 Discussion about human rights and cyberspace
often highlighted how different governments handled the rights -cyberspace
relationship.
This "second image" focus put authoritarian regimes under scrutiny and created
the perception that the internet's transnational connectivity threatened such regimes.
Wider internet access might create communication channels authoritarian
governments would have difficulty controlling. Imbuing speech in cyberspace with
human rights significance confronted authoritarian predilections to censor speech by
opponents. Internet access debates did not focus only on human rights, as illustrated
by efforts to address the "digital divide" in development policy. But, human rights
permeated this policy area, highlighting authoritarian regimes' attitudes towards civil
and political rights and supporting aspirations associated with such rights, especially
democratic governance within states.
Third-Image Pushback
Sensing these threats, authoritarian regimes began to challenge how
governments and non-state actors framed internet access and cyberspace's political
potential. This pushback attempted to shift the focus to international system issues,
such as sovereignty, non-intervention, and the exercise of political and military
power by dominant states, particularly the United States. Some democratic
governments also worried about internet universalism as promoted by the United
States, but the central debate was between democracies and authoritarian states.
The authoritarian pushback manifested itself in diplomacy about internet
governance. In the early 2000s, China led initiatives to make internet governance
more intergovernmental and subject to international law.15 To this point, internet
governance functioned through U.S.-backed multi-stakeholder processes, which
produced outcomes not negotiated by states as equals under international law.
Authoritarian governments had problems with this model of internet governance
because it looked like a U.S. power play aimed at them. The Chinese-led proposals
gained sufficient support to cause international talks to reveal a deep lack of
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agreement. Negotiations about internet governance have, essentially, been
deadlocked for over a decade-evidence of the impact China and other authoritarian
governments, including Russia, achieved.
Similarly, the Russian government began to draw attention to the military
potential the internet created and proposed measures to address dangers of a "cyber
arms race."16 Few countries failed to see that these efforts aimed directly at the
perceived advantage the United States had in military cyber power. The United States
showed no interest in cooperating with these Russian-led attempts to change the
strategic narrative and cast suspicions on U.S. cyber behavior.
Doubling Down
These challenges by authoritarian governments moved policy debates into more
polarized and controversial directions. The United States doubled down on the
second-image perspective, captured by the emphasis on "internet freedom" in U.S.
foreign policy. In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that
internet technology does not determine how states and non-state actors utilize
cyberspace. 17 Rather, the internet is an instrument
political systems can bend to their respective wills. THE INTERNET IS
Clinton believed the United States should spread a AN INSTRUMENT
"fifth freedom," the freedom to connect to the POLITICAL SYSTEMS
internet, by providing opponents of repressive
regimes with the means to circumvent controls on, CAN BEND TO THEIR
and censorship of, internet use. RESPECTIVE WILLS.
Authoritarian governments doubled down on a
third-image approach and stressed "internet sovereignty" as important for stability in
the international system. These governments not only pushed this agenda in talks on
internet governance but also through an agreement that enshrined this approach. In
2008, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional security organization
composed of authoritarian states, concluded a treaty on international information
security, which captured the internet sovereignty perspective and implemented it
through an international legal instrument.18 This strategy continued to cast the main
threat as U.S. cyber power, emphasizing not only the U.S. refusal to discuss cyber
arms issues but also its violation of the principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention through the internet freedom agenda.
Technological Non-Determinism
Perhaps the most significant development under the "internet freedom v.
internet sovereignty" clash was authoritarian regimes' realization that increasing
internet access did not necessarily make political control of cyberspace impossible.
Although not universal among authoritarian governments, many permitted increased
internet access. Table 1 lists internet penetration rates for countries often categorized
as authoritarian, in 2007 and in 2012, with the increase over this period.
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Table 1. Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet
2007 (%) 2012 (%)
Azerbaijan 14.54 54.2
Bahrain 32.91 88
Belarus 19.7 46.91
China 16 42.3
Cuba 11.69 25.64
Iran 9.47 26
Kazakhstan 4.02 53.32
Oman 16.68 60
Qatar 37 88.1
Russia 24.66 53.27
Saudi Arabia 30 54
Sudan 8.66 21
Syria* 7.83 24.3
Tajikistan 7.2 14.51
Turkmenistan 1.41 7.2
United Arab Emirates 61 85
Uzbekistan 7.49 36.52
Vietnam 20.76 39.49
Yemen 5.01 17.45
Zimbabwe 10.85 17.09
* The number in the 2007 column is the number for 2006.
Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2013
Increase (x)
3.7
2.7
2.4
2.6
2.2
2.7
13.3
3.6
2.4
2.2
1.8
2.4
3.1
2.0
5.1
1.4
4.9
1.9
3.5
1.6
As described below, heightened efforts to control and censor activities in
cyberspace often accompanied increased rates of internet use. Leaders in
democracies understood the internet had no deterministic logic favoring liberty and
democracy. As Secretary Clinton said in her speech on internet freedom, "new
technologies do not take sides in the struggle for freedom and progress," but
governments do.19 The notion the internet could support democracy advocacy and
reactionary authoritarianism deepened the divide between the internet freedom and
internet sovereignty camps.
Cjber Espionage and Cber Attacks
Another development involves anxieties in the United States and its allies about
authoritarian governments' efforts to strengthen and use their cyber power for
intelligence and military purposes. Whereas Russia and China had earlier led attempts
to produce multilateral initiatives on cyber weapons, events revealed how active these
countries were in cyber espionage and cyber attacks. Attention focused on Russia
concerning cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 and during the Russia-Georgia war in
2008.20 Western experts warned about China's embrace of cyber warfare as a way to
counter, frustrate, and defeat U.S. military power. 21 U.S. and European worries about
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Chinese cyber espionage, including economic cyber espionage against Western
companies, emerged as a major controversy.22 These developments made power
politics among rival states increasingly important in the debate about cyberspace's
impact on international relations, a debate previously dominated by the "internet
freedom v. internet sovereignty" contest.
Feeding rea/politik thinking were revelations in 2010 that the United States, in
cooperation with Israel, developed a cyber weapon-the Stuxnet worm-and used
it to disrupt and destroy uranium enrichment centrifuges in Iran in order to set back
Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program.23 This incident reinforced concerns many
governments had about U.S. cyber power and cyber-weapon capabilities. The Stuxnet
attack had nothing to do with promoting democracy in Iran and focused attention
on traditional concerns of anarchical international politics, such as war, weapons, and
the struggle for national security.
Arab SpingAmbigui
As Stuxnet magnified reapolitik perspectives, the Arab Spring in 2011
rejuvenated internet freedom advocates, whiplashing attention back to the "second
image" perspective on the internet's importance in international relations. This
renewal began earlier than the Arab Spring with the attention given to use of social
media, including Twitter, in the unsuccessful "Green Revolution" following disputed
elections in Iran in 2009. Andrew Sullivan's blog headline "The Revolution Will be
Twittered" in June 2009 captured the belief that internet-enabled communications
threaten authoritarian rulers. 24 Excitement about social media and internet
communications as weapons against authoritarian regimes arose as the Arab Spring
revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya unfolded. However, what contributions
social media made to these revolutions remains debated, as does whether revolutions
in key countries, especially Egypt and Libya, succeeded or failed. For my purposes,
debates about internet-facilitated communications in the Arab Spring focused
attention on the threat the internet poses to authoritarian regimes, reinforcing the
"second image" lens on cyberspace's place in international relations.
AUTHORITARIANISM V. AMERICA IN CYBERSPACE
Competition between second and third-image perspectives helps explain
authoritarian leaders' increased use of the internet for propaganda and other
purposes. Authoritarian regimes pushed back against the interventionism of internet
freedom and emphasized Westphalian concerns like sovereignty, non-intervention,
threats to national security, and balancing power vis-a-vis the strongest rival state-
the United States. Shielded by internet sovereignty, authoritarian leaders perceive the
benefits of exploiting cyberspace outweigh the costs.
This conclusion signals that authoritarian regimes believe they can manage the
internet's consequences so that cyberspace does not threaten the leadership's grip on
power. Put another way, authoritarian leaders have developed sufficient confidence
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in the capabilities of their regimes to control the politics of internet access to
embrace cyberspace for their own purposes. This confidence provides the backdrop
for what appears, from the internet freedom perspective, paradoxical-many
authoritarian regimes have expanded internet access while also increasing their
control over internet use.
Internet Acces, Dependence, and Vulnerabili in Authoritarian Regimes
In The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, Evgeny Morozov argued
that propaganda, censorship, and surveillance form the "trinity of authoritarianism,"
and that the internet affects how authoritarian governments engage in these
activities. 25 Morozov asserted that the internet makes propaganda, censorship, and
surveillance strategies more interconnected than ever before, producing
opportunities for authoritarian governments to influence internet usage. Increasing
access provides means to heighten surveillance (e.g., monitoring e-mail, social media
sites, and blogs), possibilities for more censorship (e.g., restricting access to content
through filtering), and avenues to increase propaganda (e.g., using social media to
attack opponents and spread pro-government messages). In Freedom on the Net
2013, Freedom House concluded that internet freedom is suffering worldwide
because of various forms of internet control, with increased surveillance being the
most prominent trend (Table 2).26
Table 2. Most Frequently Used Government Internet Control Strategies
1. Blocking and filtering 6. Surveillance
2. Cyberattacks against regime critics 7. Takedown and deletion
requests
3. New laws and arrests 8. Blocking social media and
communication apps
4. Paid pro-government commentators 9. Intermediate liability
5. Physical attacks and murders 10. Throttling or
shutting down service
Source: Freedom House, 2013
Writing for Freedom House, Andrew Rizzardi highlighted efforts authoritarian
governments have made to obtain technological capabilities to strengthen their
strategies in cyberspace:
The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egyp, and Libja demonstrated the power of
new media in initiating political change from the bottom up. This did not go unnoticed bj
authoritarian leaders in other countie, who rp onded bj pursuing advanced technical
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infrastructure and expertise with which to monitor and control cuting-edge outlets of dissent
like social-nelworking sites and mobile device. Dictators seeking sophisficated tools of
repression need look nofurther than China, the authoritarian telecommunications hardware
store. 27
What makes increased internet access and greater authoritarian control of
cyberspace possible is individual and societal dependence on the internet. The first
and second-image perspectives equate internet access with individual political
empowerment and thus seek more and deeper access. Many authoritarian regimes
have decided to wager that internet access means dependence on technologies that
they can exploit for surveillance, censorship, and propaganda. Such regimes do not
perceive the internet as an
authoritarian panopticon, but CYBER DEPENDENCE HAS
they do not need it to be.
Authoritarian leaders' GENERATED WILLINGNESS IN
increasing use of social media DEMOCRACIES TO VIEW THE
is not only propaganda, but
also a statement that they do INTERNET AND CYBERSPACE
not fear cyberspace because INCREASINGLY IN THIRD-IMAGE
they have learned how to TERMS.
operate in this realm. The
strategy involves creating
individual, social, and economic dependence on the internet while developing the
capacity to exploit dependence for the preservation of power. For opponents of
authoritarian regimes, cyber dependence means vulnerability which creates problems
if, as proclaimed in the West, internet access leads to transformative political change.
Cyber Dependence Meets Anarchical Politics in the USA.
Individual, economic, and social dependence on the internet has other
implications for international relations beyond allowing authoritarian leaders to tweet
with Orwellian intent. Authoritarian regimes have framed internet issues through a
third-image lens not only to protect against liberal ideology and interventionist
policies but also to provide cover for repression in cyberspace. Interestingly, cyber
dependence has generated willingness in democracies to view the internet and
cyberspace increasingly in third-image terms. We see this phenomenon in the
evolution of U.S. thinking about cybersecurity.
U.S. cybersecurity policy has developed three patterns I call the cyber threat,
cyber defense, and cyber technology approaches. The cyber-threat approach involves
classifying cyber threats and incidents into traditional categories-crime, terrorism,
espionage, and armed conflict-and applying policy prescriptions and legal rules
associated with these categories. Although prominent in cybersecurity policy, the
cyber-threat approach is criticized for doing little to protect computer systems from
intrusions or to prevent attacks from happening in the first place.
This critique informs the cyber-defense approach, which seeks to strengthen
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cyber defenses in order to prevent damage from cyber threats and to protect against
intrusions. Under this approach, building better defenses does not require classifying
cyber threats as crime, terrorism, espionage, or war. Rather, it is an "all hazards"
strategy to protect against threats from any source. Its raises different policy and
legal issues, including questions about the extent to which companies can employ
"active defenses." The cyber-defense emphasis also faces criticisms, especially the
charge that it places too much confidence in defensive measures in a context where
the offense has the advantage.
The third pattern reveals interest in "full spectrum" cyber capabilities to
undertake robust defensive measures and offensive actions. This strategy focuses on
ensuring that the government develops and maintains powerful technological
capabilities for protecting against cyber attacks and, where necessary, engaging in
cyber espionage and cyber warfare. Having such capabilities deters adversaries and,
if deterrence fails, provides means for defeating threats. The U.S. government's
decision to establish a new military command, U.S. Cyber Command
(CYBERCOM), to develop the U.S. military's defensive and offensive cyber
capabilities demonstrates the importance of this pattern.
More could be said about each approach, but these patterns grapple differently
with the threats and vulnerabilities dependence that the internet creates for U.S.
national security. U.S. government warnings about cyber intrusions and attacks
against government agencies and the private sector underscore the sense in
Washington, D.C. that non-state actors, such as cyber-crime organizations or
terrorists, and rival powers, such as China, are exploiting the vulnerabilities that
American internet dependence creates.
As awareness of the vulnerabilities has grown, U.S. cybersecurity policy has
gravitated towards the cyber-technology strategy. Of the three patterns, the cyber-
technology approach most closely parallels prescriptions associated with third-image
perspectives on international relations-states must meet exogenous security threats
with "self-help" measures designed to harness material power to deter and defeat
such threats. Increased U.S. attention on cybersecurity in the past decade included
efforts to strengthen cyber capabilities in the U.S. intelligence community (e.g., the
National Security Agency (NSA)) and the military (e.g., CYBERCOM). In terms of
personnel and money, the emphasis on intelligence and military cyber power far
surpasses U.S. diplomatic activities on internet freedom. This emphasis brought
forth concerns about the U.S. government's "militarization" of cyberspace. 28
Based on the above, do we see convergence of authoritarian leaders and U.S.
officials on viewing the internet and cyberspace predominantly through the lens of
power politics? Certainly, authoritarian regimes and the United States have third-
image outlooks for different reasons, but a feature of third-image thinking is the
discounting of motives in order to concentrate on actual state behavior. The more
such a convergence appears plausible, the more this perception benefits authoritarian
leaders whose modus operandi, internally and externally, is power politics. In this
context, the onus is on the United States and other supporters of internet freedom
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to demonstrate their behavior reflects commitment to democratic principles at home
and solidarity abroad, rather than the prescriptions of realpo/itik.
And then along came Edward Snowden.
THE SNOWDEN AFFAIR
At the beginning of June 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor for the NSA,
began disclosing classified information about activities of the NSA and other parts
of the U.S. government. From early June until this writing the disclosures continued,
and Snowden is likely to leak more. Snowden's disclosures have many features and
implications, and this essay does not attempt a comprehensive examination. For my
purposes, the Snowden affair's most important feature is its impact on perceptions
about U.S. behavior in cyberspace.
The impact has hurt the United States badly. The disclosures have created or
reinforced perceptions that the United States acts without constraint because it has
the technological capabilities and power to act unilaterally against perceived threats
or to gain advantages vis-d-vis other nations. The disclosures support the observation
that U.S. cybersecurity policy has shifted towards developing and using cyber
technologies for offensive and defensive intelligence and military purposes. The leaks
suggest a country acting more in line with the tenets of realpo/itik than internet
freedom-the accusation authoritarian governments have made against the United
States.
Snowden's disclosures undermine second-image framings of the internet's place
in international relations in three ways. First, revelations about the domestic
telephony metadata collection program caused controversies, including how "secret
jurisprudence" interpretations of federal law affected privacy rights in the United
States. 29 Snowden's leaks provided insights into how much NSA surveillance
targeting foreign nationals outside the United States catches communications of U.S.
persons.30 For many the scale, intensity, and secrecy of NSA surveillance affecting
the communications of U.S. persons made the internet and cyberspace feel less
empowering and less free.
Second, various Snowden disclosures revealed substantial U.S. cyber espionage
conducted against not only rivals but also allies and friendly countries. At the time of
Snowden's first disclosure, the United States had been criticizing China for cyber
espionage it conducted against the U.S. government and companies. 31 Snowden
subsequently disclosed significant U.S. cyber espionage activities against the Chinese
government, companies, and universities, and thus handed China evidence
supporting its accusations of American cyber spying in China.32
Snowden also disclosed that the United States spied on allies in the European
Union. 33 In response, Germany demanded an explanation and terminated its
intelligence sharing accord with the United States. 34 Later came revelations about
U.S. cyber espionage against Mexico and Brazil, which led the President of Brazil to
cancel a state visit to the United States and criticize the United States harshly in her
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speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2013. 35 The Obama
administration's response that every country engages in intelligence gathering only
made matters worse, as did telling the Brazilian President that the United States
hacked her e-mail as part of U.S. counter-terrorism strategy.3 6 For authoritarian
leaders, the spectacle of the champion of internet freedom engaging in cyber
espionage against democracies and justifying it because "everybody does it" was a
political gift.
Third, Snowden disclosed information about U.S. offensive cyber operations by
leaking Presidential Decision Directive 20 (PDD 20), finalized in classified form in
October 2012.3 PDD 20 defined different cyber operations the U.S. government
would undertake while establishing principles and processes for them.38 Under PDD
20, President Obama instructed the Executive Branch to "identify potential targets"
where,
Offensive Cjyber Effec/s Operations (OCEO)... offer afavorable balance of effectiveness and
risk compared wi/h other instruments of nationalpower, establish and maintain OCEO
capabiliies integrated as appropriate with other U.S. offensive capabilitie, and execute
those capabiities in a manner consistent with the provisions of this directive. 39
PDD 20 defined OCEO as U.S. government operations-other than defensive or
espionage activities-undertaken with the intent to enable or produce the
manipulation, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction or computers,
computer systems or networks, infrastructure controlled by such systems or
networks, or the information located thereon. 40 Although U.S. interest in offensive
cyber capabilities was known before PDD 20 was disclosed, its release underscored
the seriousness of U.S. interest in offensive cyber power.
Then, Snowden's leak of the classified intelligence budget, the so-called "Black
Budget," revealed that U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber
operations in 2011, the year before PDD 20's approval. 41 The Black Budget did not
illuminate what it meant by "offensive cyber operations," indicating only that "nearly
three-quarters were against top-priority targets... such as Iran, Russia, China and
North Korea and activities such as nuclear proliferation." 42 However, PDD 20's
definition of OCEO provides guidance on what offensive cyber operations in the
Black Budget probably entailed. These 231 operations were, in all likelihood, not
defensive actions or intelligence gathering activities but were offensive cyber attacks
intended to disrupt, manipulate, degrade, or destroy computers or information of
foreign targets.
According to the New York Times, these operations revealed "how aggressively
the United States is now conducting offensive cyber-operations against other
nations, even as the Obama administration protests attacks on American computer
networks by China, Iran, and Russia.1 43 The Washington Post noted that "[tihe scope
and scale of offensive operations represent an evolution in policy, which in the past
sought to preserve an international norm against aggression in cyberspace[.]" 44
Former Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III explained this shift in a way
Seton Hall Journal of Dplomacy and International Relations
LEADERS AND THE INTERNET
that underscores the U.S. cybersecurity policy move into "full spectrum" capabilities:
The poli debate has moved so that offensive options are more prominent now I think
there's more of a case made now that offensive -er-options can be an important element in
detering certain adversaies.
45
Snowden's disclosures about NSA surveillance of the communications of U.S.
citizens and foreign nationals, U.S. cyber espionage, and U.S. offensive cyber
operations have marginalized internet freedom as a theme of U.S. cyber behavior,
much to the delight of authoritarian regimes. Indeed, Snowden's leaks accumulated
into a pile of evidence that the United States treats the internet and cyberspace as an
instrument of power politics against allies and adversaries alike-an outcome more
consistent with realpolitik than liberal thinking in international relations.
CONCLUSION
In light of Snowden's disclosures, former NSA and CIA Director Michael
Hayden admitted in September 2013 that the United States "could be fairly charged
with the militarization of the World Wide Web.' 46 Asked to justify U.S. behavior,
Hayden said U.S. activities are partly justified because the internet originated in the
United States, was "quintessentially American," and the United States still carried
much global internet traffic. 47 Each reason corresponds to complaints authoritarian
governments have long made about American power, and its alleged abuse, within
cyberspace.
Even debating whether the United States has militarized the internet serves the
interests of authoritarian leaders, who excel at exploiting cyber technologies in the
name of power politics. Snowden's disclosures drain away the credibility of second-
image narratives about the internet which favor the United States, leaving U.S. policy
with an approach resembling what realism would predict for any technology caught
in the anarchical politics among states. For many, American cyber exceptionalism
after Snowden might appear like unilateralism and militarism, casting shadows on the
potential of this "quintessentially American" invention to transform politics within
or among nations. This perception, no matter how unfair, plays into the hands of
authoritarian leaders, who appear to sense they might finally be leveling the playing
field in the international politics of cyberspace. Through increased social-media
propaganda, strengthened cyber censorship and surveillance, and the damage
Snowden has caused the United States, authoritarian leaders have adapted to the
internet and cyberspace, turning what was once threatening into a tool for preserving
power and gaining influence.
Le cyberespace, c'est moi? Not yet, but the possibility unfortunately does not seem
as ridiculous as once it might have been. No wonder Assad is smiling in his
Instagram pictures.
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